implies that in equilibrium the probability of guilt for motorists who are searched should be equal across races, unless the police are prejudiced against one group (in the sense that the police are willing to search that group even when the expected return is lower than that for the other group). KPT use a dataset on police stops along Interstate-95 in Maryland during the period January 1995 -January 1999, collected by the Maryland ACLU in connection with a lawsuit against the state.
3 They conclude that the data is consistent with the hypothesis of unbiased policing with respect to African-Americans. This finding has been influential in the debate on racial profiling in the United States and elsewhere. 4 The KPT model addresses the classic concern about omitted variable bias that arises with both performance based and adverse treatment based studies of discrimination. Intuitively, potential offenders adjust their behavior in response to the possibility of being searched by the police. Those who may appear to have the most to gain from carrying contraband will also be the most likely to be searched if they do not adjust their behavior. This randomizing equilibrium breaks the link between the expected return to an action and the observed frequency of that action, and thus between the observed frequency and the unobservable individual attributes that are correlated with the expected return.
This paper generalizes the KPT model in two ways. First, we account for the possibility that potential offenders may not be observed by the police (which creates the possibility that the latter do not randomize). 5 Multiple types of equilibria exist in this model, and the test applied in KPT only provides a valid test for prejudice for equilibria where police randomize. Second, we include two different levels of offense severity. In this more general setting, the paper develops valid tests for prejudice given each type of equilibrium. This analysis shows that the Maryland data is consistent with policing that is biased against or in favor of African-American males, or is unbiased, depending on which equilibrium is being played. These results suggest that theory is unlikely to solve the omitted variables problem associated with tests for racial prejudice and discrimination in law enforcement and in other contexts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 below briefly reviews the basic model from KPT. Sections 3 and 4 present the model extensions and empirical analyses, respectively. Section 5 concludes. 3 Very recently, new data sets that contain additional information, such as the race of the officer, have become available -see Antonovics and Knight (2004) and Anwar and Fang (2004) . 4 See e.g. Borooah (2002) , Gross and Barnes (2002) , and Dominitz (2003) . 5 Bjerk (2004) applies this imperfect observability assumption to a broader theoretical investigation of racial profiling. Persico (2002) extends the KPT model in a number of directions, but does not deal with this particular issue.
2) The Basic Model
KPT develop a model that has two types of actors -a continuum of motorists and a continuum of police officers. Each motorist is characterized by (c, r) , where r є {A, W} is the motorist's race (either African-American (A) or white (W)), and c is a continuous variable that represents the motorist's nonracial characteristics. Note that c is observable to the police, but is unobserved (or only partially observed) by the researcher. Given their characteristics, and the anticipated probability of being searched by the police, motorists choose whether or not to carry drugs. Each motorist receives a default payoff of 0 from not carrying drugs (whether or not she is searched). If a motorist of type (c, r) chooses to carry drugs, she receives a payoff of v(c, r) if not searched and -j(c, r) if searched.
The police observe each motorist's characteristics (c, r), and decide whether or not to search. Crucially, KPT assume that, for any type (c, r), the police can choose any search probability γ є [0, 1]. The police have the following objective function: to maximize expected benefits (where the benefit from a successful search is normalized to 1), net of the cost to the police of searching cars. This cost can depend on the motorist's race, and is denoted by t W , t A є (0, 1), for r = W, A, respectively. KPT define the preferences of the police as being "prejudiced" against A's if t W < t A (i.e. if the police have lower costs of searching A's, for a given benefit).
The game between motorists and the police does not have a pure strategy equilibrium. 6 Thus, KPT analyze a mixed-strategy equilibrium, where motorists randomize over whether to carry drugs, and the police randomize over whether to search. In the simple case where c (like r) is binary (say, c є {0, 1}, which, as will be explained below, does not involve any significant loss of generality, KPT's mixed-strategy equilibrium can be characterized as follows: 1) the police randomize by setting γ
2) all motorists randomize by setting the probability of carrying drugs (denoted by P*(G)) to P*(G | 0, W) = P*(G | 1, W) = t W and P*(G | 0, A) = P*(G | 1, A) = t A where P*(G | c, r) denotes the equilibrium probability of guilt of a motorist, conditional on the motorist's type (c, r): i.e. the probability with which motorists of type (c, r) choose to carry drugs.
In this equilibrium, it is possible that a motorist's probability of being searched depends on race. However, if police are unprejudiced (i.e. t W = t A ≡ t), then it follows that the probability of guilt (denoted D) for motorists of each race is the same in equilibrium -i.e.
D(W) = D(A) = t If this is the case, then any difference in the search probabilities across the races can be interpreted as "statistical discrimination" (in the sense of being caused by the efforts of the police to apprehend motorists carrying drugs), rather than being attributable to prejudice.
3) Extensions to the Basic Model

3.1) Imperfect Observation and Police Nonrandomization
A crucial assumption of KPT's model is that the police can choose to search any motorist with probability one. In these circumstances, they argue that: "For our test to fail, we would need to have a fraction of "crazy" criminals who are not deterred even if they know for sure that they are going to be caught" (KPT, p. 214, fn. 16). The assumption requires that the police are omniscient (or at least omnipresent), and thus seems to strain credibility. A simple generalization of the KPT model is to assume that there is a probability m є (0, 1) that any given motorist is observed by the police. 7 We reinterpret the probability of search γ є [0, 1] as the probability that the police search a motorist, conditional on observing her. Thus, even if the police always search a given type contingent on observing that type (i.e. set γ = 1 for that type), the highest feasible unconditional probability of search is m < 1. Thus, m provides an upper bound to the probability that a motorist -even one who appears to be carrying contraband -is searched. This upper bound is crucial to our results, as explained below; it gives rise to the possibility of equilibria where the police play pure strategies, and the KPT test for prejudice does not hold. Of course, this upper bound could be motivated in ways other than our assumption of imperfect observability.
Specifically, if the motorist is observed (with probability m), then she faces a γ probability of search. If the motorist is not observed (with probability (1 -m)), she gets the payoff v if she carries drugs. Thus, KPT's Eq. (1) (p. 209) -the expected payoff to a motorist of type (c, r) from carrying drugs -now becomes:
7 There are many reasons why the police may not have observed every motorist who traveled within or through the state during this period, such as the limited resources and/or limited attention of the police. In fact, many variables that influence the decision to search may only be apparent after the police have stopped the vehicle, and therefore m may be quite small in practice.
The motorist will be willing to randomize if the expression above equals 0. Rearranging, we obtain the following expression (analogous to that in KPT, p. 211) for the critical value γ*(c, r) that makes type (c, r) willing to randomize:
In KPT's model, γ*(c, r) < 1 for any type (c, r): every type of motorist is willing to randomize for some feasible search probability γ*(c, r). Here, in contrast, since (1/m) > 1, it is possible that γ*(c, r) > 1 for some types of motorists, so that there are some types who are not willing to randomize for any feasible γ. These types will carry drugs with probability 1, and the police will set γ = 1 for these types (i.e. will search them whenever they are observed). It is important to stress that such a motorist is not "crazy" (in the sense used by KPT, p. 214, fn. 16), because she is not facing an unconditional probability of search of one. For those types that always carry drugs, the rewards are sufficient to outweigh a probability m of being searched.
It should be noted that an offender choosing to offend with certainty does not entail that they always carry drugs. Rather, the crucial issue is whether they randomize or not. Offenders have a personal life and a business life; those who are not willing to randomize for any feasible γ will always choose to carry drugs when going about their business. Thus, for example, such an offender whose business activities involve transporting drugs from New York City to Baltimore will not undertake business trips between these cities sometimes randomly carrying drugs and at other times not doing so. However, even such an individual may not carry drugs while going about their personal life.
Our seemingly minor change in assumptions has quite drastic consequences for the equilibrium, and for the validity of KPT's test for prejudice. Consider a situation where γ*(1, A), γ*(1, W) ≥ 1 (i.e. there does not exist an equilibrium where the police randomize over searching motorists of type c = 1), while γ*(0, W), γ*(0, A) < 1 (so that the police are willing to randomize over searching motorists of type c = 0). Thus, motorists of type c = 1 will always carry drugs; for convenience, we will refer to type c = 1 as "dealers" (and to type c = 0 as "nondealers") because the former receive a larger net benefit from carrying drugs (this is of course without loss of generality, as the labeling of types is arbitrary).
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For the police to be willing to randomize over searching motorists of type c = 0, it has to be the case that: mP*(G | 0, W) = t W and mP*(G | 0, A) = t A i.e. the expected payoff of the police is zero (the benefit to police from an arrest is normalized to 1, so the expected payoff is the (unconditional) probability of arrest, minus the cost of search). For motorists of type c = 0 to be willing to randomize, it has to be that case that (t W /m) < 1 and (t A /m) < 1. This is analogous to KPT's assumption that t W < 1 and t A < 1 (p. 209).
9 Given these assumptions, we can characterize the following equilibrium: 1) the police randomize over c = 0 types by setting γ*(0, W), γ*(0, A) є (0,1) 2) the police always search c = 1 types whenever they are observed: i.e. γ*(1, W) = γ*(1, A) = 1) 3) motorists of type c = 0 randomize by setting the probability of carrying drugs to P*(G | 0, W) = t W /m and P*(G | 0, A) = t A /m 4) Motorists of type c =1 always carry drugs -i.e. P*( G | 1, W) = P*(G | 1, A) = 1 Now consider the empirical implications of this equilibrium. The KPT test for prejudice remains valid only if the distribution of types is identical across races. For instance, suppose that Pr[c = 1 | r = A] > Pr[c = 1 | r = W] (so that a larger fraction of A's (relative to W's) are "dealers"). In the equilibrium specified above, P*(G | 1, ·) = 1 for dealers of both races. Thus, police search behavior when a c = 1 type is observed is uninformative about police prejudice. This is because, by assumption, t W , t A є (0, 1); hence, γ*(1, W) = γ*(1, A) = 1 is consistent with any admissible t W and t A . On the other hand, as c = 0 types of both races are randomizing, the KPT argument applies: if t W = t A = t, then it follows that P*(G | 0, W) = P*(G | 0, A) = t.
When there are more dealers among A's than among W's, the fraction of (1, A) types who are found guilty (as a fraction of all A's searched) will be larger than the corresponding fraction among W's. Combining this with the equal values of P* for c = 0 types of both races, it follows that if the police are unprejudiced, then the observed probability of guilt has to be higher for A's (i.
e D(A) > D(W)).
In other words, observing equal D's for the two races may well be consistent with police prejudice. Thus, the KPT test for prejudice is not valid when the equilibrium generating the observed outcomes is of the form specified above.
We have assumed that c is a discrete variable for expositional ease, the basic argument above is unaffected by assuming a continuous c. In KPT's model, for each type (c, r), there exists some search probability γ*(c, r) < 1 for which that type is willing to randomize. Once we introduce imperfect observation (m < 1), the expression for this probability is given by Eq. (2) above. When m < 1, if there is any c for which γ*(c, r) ≥ 1, then the KPT test is no longer valid. Such a type would set P*(G) = 1, and the police would set γ*(c, r) = 1; the latter's search behavior would not be informative about the presence of prejudice. Note, moreover, that for lower values of m, it becomes more reasonable to suppose that γ* ≥ 1 for some type.
KPT (p. 214) also offer an alternative interpretation of their model, in which motorists do not randomize in equilibrium. Rather, they have private information (unobservable to the police) concerning their utility from carrying drugs. Within a particular observable category (i.e. a given c), some motorists will choose to carry and others to not do so, depending on their unobservable preference parameter (which can be modeled as a "random utility" term). Because the random utility realization is not observed by the police, the motorists are, in effect, randomizing from the perspective of the police. Thus, the KPT empirical test remains valid under this interpretation (noting that no type of c can consist entirely of motorists who always carry, because this type would then be searched with probability one).
Our extension also applies to this version of the KPT model. With imperfect observability, it becomes possible that the preference parameters of all motorists within a given observable category (e.g. c = 1) are such that all these motorists would carry drugs. This may seem unlikely in the case where c is binary, but it should be remembered that this is a simplification for expositional convenience. When the number of types of c is large, or c is a continuum, then it is reasonable to suppose that there may exist some types of c within which all motorists offend.
3.2) Offense Severity
In this section, we retain the assumption of imperfect observability, and consider offenses of varying severity. In their empirical analysis, KPT consider a number of different definitions of guilt, taking into account variations in the quantity and type of drugs carried by motorists. However, their theoretical model only allows two (pure strategy) choices for the motorist: to carry or not carry drugs. Here, we introduce the possibility that there are two levels of offenses -a less severe offense (such as carrying a small quantity of drugs), denoted by L, and a high-severity offense (such as carrying a large quantity of drugs or carrying "hard" drugs), denoted by H. Each motorist thus has three pure strategies: to carry nothing (denoted N), L and H. For this extension, potential offenders sort over low and high severity offenses. For equilibria involving non-randomizing offenders, offense severity can be used to restrict the sample to randomizers, providing valid tests for prejudice.
Let the payoff from committing L be denoted by v L (c, r) if not searched, and -j L (c, r) if searched. Denote the payoff from committing H as v H (c, r) if not searched, and -j H (c, r) if searched. Let G H and G L denote the events that a motorist is guilty of offenses H and L, respectively, and let D H and D L be the guilt probabilities for each offense. As before, the payoff from not carrying is zero, whether or not the motorist is searched. Also as before, let γ(c, r) be the probability of search chosen by the police, given that the motorist is observed, and let m be the probability of being observed. Once again, we assume that c є {0, 1} for expositional convenience (although the intuition carries through to the case where c is continuous).
When there are offenses of differing severity, it seems natural to assume that the benefits derived by the police from arresting motorists for each offense are different.
10 That is, it appears likely that (normalizing the return from an arrest for H to 1) the return from an arrest for L would be b, where (typically) one would expect that b є (0, 1). However, under these assumptions, the KPT model no longer implies equal guilt rates by race under the null of no prejudice unless both groups commit felonies at the same rate.
11 Thus, in order to preserve comparability with the KPT test, we maintain the assumption that the police receive equal returns from arrests for each offense. Some evidence supporting this assumption at least within the context of the KPT model is provided later in the empirical section of the paper.
Consider a motorist of given type (c, r): she can choose any of the following classes of mixed strategies -(i) play N, (ii) play L, (iii) play H, (iv) randomize between N and L, (v) randomize between N and H, (vi) randomize between L and H, (vii) randomize between N, L, and H. Clearly, there are many possible cases, even when c is assumed to be binary. However, given the assumptions above, it is possible to eliminate most of these cases. For example, consider the class of equilibria where some type(s) randomize over L and H. Recall that equilibria exist where motorists randomize, for instance, between N and L because for any given set of parameter values, there exists a search probability for which the motorist is indifferent between N and L. In contrast, as a motorist who randomizes over L and H will always carry some quantity of drugs, the police will not adjust their behavior in response to the randomization, instead simply setting γ = 1 (i.e. the unconditional probability of search = m). A type (c, r) will randomize between L and H if:
(
10 Gross and Barnes (2002) provide evidence that African-American drivers are more likely to be guilty of serious offenses. They suggest that racial profiling by police may in fact be motivated by a desire to obtain convictions for these serious offenses. This evidence supports our assumption that police and criminal behavior is likely to vary by offense type. 11 In part of their empirical analysis, KPT only count the most serious offenses as successful searches assuming, in effect, that b = 0 for less serious offenses.
The underlying parameter spaces for m and for the motorists' payoffs (the v's and j's) are continuous. Thus, it is clear that the condition above can only hold for a subset of the parameter space that is of measure zero -for generic parameter values, equilibria where some type(s) randomize over L and H can be ruled out. This argument can also be extended to rule out equilibria where some type(s) randomize over N, L and H. The possible equilibria can be further restricted by imposing a requirement of consistency with the basic features of the observed data. An analysis of the data by type of offense shows that all offense types considered were committed in equilibrium by members of each race. Thus, equilibria in which at most one type of offense is committed can be ruled out as being inconsistent with the observed data. 12 We are thus left with the following three cases to consider (noting that the labeling of types as c = 0 and c = 1 is arbitrary, and so can be interchanged in each case):
Fully Randomizing Equilibria: 1) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and H (i.e. choose P*(G H | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(G L | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N and L (i.e. choose P*(G L | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(G H | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0, 1) and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1) Assuming one of these types of equilibria prevails, one can test for prejudice simply by comparing probabilities of guilt (of each offense) for each race. This is essentially the test that KPT implement. However, this is not a valid test if the observed data is generated by equilibrium behavior other than that of case 1.
Equilibria with Randomization over Low-level Offenses: 2) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) randomize between N and L (i.e. choose P*(G L | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(G H | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) play H (i.e. choose P*(G H | 0, r) = 1 and P*(G L | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) є (0, 1) and γ*(1, r) = 1 Here, a subset of motorists (identifiable to the police but not to the econometrician) are playing a strategy of always carrying a large quantity of drugs (i.e. committing H). For these motorists, a comparison of probabilities of guilt across races will not be informative about police prejudice. This is because, by assumption, t W , t A є (0, 1); hence, γ*(c, W) = γ*(c, A) = 1 is consistent with any admissible t W and t A . In this setting, a valid test for prejudice requires omitting all observations where a motorist is found guilty of H, and testing for the equality of probabilities of guilt (of offense L) for the remaining sample.
Equilibria with Randomization over High-level Offenses:
3) For each r, motorists of type (0, r) play L (i.e. choose P*(G L | 0, r) = 1 and P*(G H | 0, r) = 0), while motorists of type (1, r) randomize between N and H (i.e. choose P*(G H | 0, r) є (0, 1) and P*(G L | 0, r) = 0); the police set γ*(0, r) = 1 and γ*(1, r) є (0, 1) This represents the case where a subset of motorists always carry a small quantity (i.e. commit L). Thus, a valid test for prejudice requires omitting all observations where a motorist is found guilty of L, and testing for the equality of probabilities of guilt (of offense H) for the remaining sample.
These tests are also useful for the generalization discussed above and by KPT where offenders have private information. Consider the case where the underlying return to carrying and the return to committing a high level offense (relative to a low level offense) are both positively related to the sum of c and an index representing the motorist's private information. Given the empirical fact that both offense types are observed, the threshold for carrying must be "below" the threshold between offense types. If the variance associated with private information is constant or even decreases in c, motorist types who always carry (if these types exist) will be disproportionately represented among the sample of motorists who commit the high level offense, and dropping motorists who commit the high level offense will mitigate the omitted variable bias. This selection strategy will also eliminate some members of the motorist types where not all members offend, but under the null hypothesis of no prejudice this selection does not alter racial differences in guilty rates.
4) Empirical Analysis
4.1) Reanalysis of Maryland ACLU Data
The data used by KPT were collected as part of a lawsuit settlement between the ACLU and the Maryland State Police. 13 The settlement required the state to maintain detailed records on motorist searches and to file quarterly reports with the court and the ACLU. The data contains 1,590 observations on all motor vehicle searches on a section of Interstate 95 in Maryland over the period 1995-1999. 14 Our model differs from KPT in two ways: 1) Police do not always observe potential offenders and as a result police may not randomize, and 2) potential offenders choose between two levels of offense and different types may separate over these offense levels. The empirical tests arising from these extensions 13 KPT use microdata drawn from a specific geographic area. See Donohue and Levitt (2001) for an analysis of racial differences in arrests using aggregate data across 134 metropolitan areas. 14 See KPT for further details. suggest stratifying the sample by guilt severity for those that offend.
15 Therefore, the first task of this paper is to choose a stratification of offenses. In their empirical analysis, KPT apply increasingly more stringent definitions of guilt starting with any controlled substance (Guilt 1), eliminating offenses involving amounts marijuana less than 2 grams (Guilt 2), eliminating offenses involving marijuana only (Guilt 3), and finally only considering offenses involving felony amounts of contraband. Using these definitions of guilt, KPT found no evidence of racial prejudice against African-Americans. Guilt frequencies were nearly identical for white and African-American motorists over all offenses, and after dropping offenses involving small quantities of marijuana they found higher rates of guilt among African-Americans suggesting reverse discrimination by state police. Table 1 presents a similar breakdown of offenses. The sample contains 1473 searches of white and African-American motorists of which 1007 or 68 percent are of African-American motorists. The first two columns show the distribution of searches by race over offense category. The first row is the percentage of searches for which no contraband was found. The next three rows represent the percentages of searches where misdemeanor offenses were identified involving small amounts of marijuana, larger, non-felony amounts of marijuana, and hard drugs, respectively. The final category shows the percentage of searches locating felony amounts of contraband. 15 It should be noted that our empirical analysis focuses on the case where there are multiple levels of offenses, as well as imperfect observability. When the offense is homogeneous, a valid test for prejudice is not available given the data limitations. In particular, information about the distribution of c across races is required. The multiple level of offense extension addresses this problem by providing predictions about sorting over offense type that can be used to infer information about c.
The racial pattern of offenses is striking. Although no racial differences in the likelihood of guilt exist overall, African-Americans are more likely to be guilty of felonies, and whites have higher guilty rates on misdemeanors for any of the three offense categories. Columns three and four show the frequency of guilt divided between misdemeanors and felony. African-Americans have a 6 percentage point lower guilty rate for misdemeanors overall and a 9 percentage point higher guilty rate for felonies. Racial differences in the pattern of guilt are statistically significant with less than a 0.001 chance of error for both the modified KPT categorization and the categorization of offenses into felony and non-felony.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that KPT's strategy of simply dropping low level offenses is not necessarily an appropriate way to handle offense heterogeneity. In fact, the identification of an appropriate strategy depends upon the type of equilibrium arising in the economy. Under the assumptions that all types randomize (case 1), and that the police return to identifying guilty motorists does not vary by level of guilt, the appropriate test is the primary test provided by KPT where overall frequencies of guilt are compared for white and AfricanAmerican motorists. Table 2 Panel A shows the results for these tests overall and by gender. African-Americans have a three percentage point higher guilty rate overall, but the difference is not statistically significant. No meaningful racial difference exists in the frequency of guilt for African-American males, but a 22 percentage point difference in guilty rates for females, which is statistically significant at the 2 percent level, suggests prejudice against white females or reverse discrimination.
On the other hand, if equilibria 2 or 3 are assumed to describe the behavior of motorists and police, one type of motorist will randomize and the other type will offend with certainty. Under these circumstances, the correct strategy is to compare frequency of guilt after dropping the type that offends with certainty, which can be accomplished by simply dropping the offense level that is chosen by the type that offends with certainty. In equilibrium 2, some types of motorists commit high level offenses or felonies with certainty while in equilibrium 3, some types commit low level offenses with certainty. In each of these equilibria, some types randomize, and an unbiased test for prejudice can be obtained from a sample consisting only of these types. For equilibrium 2, since certain types commit high level offenses with certainty, those types are never not guilty or guilty of low level offenses, so a sample consisting only of those types that are randomizing is obtained by dropping those that are guilty of high level offenses. Similarly, a sample consisting only of those types that are randomizing is obtained in equilibrium 3 by dropping those guilty of low level offenses.
Panels B and C of Table 2 show the results for these alternative tests of prejudice. If some types commit high level infractions or felonies with certainty (equilibrium 2), whites have a 4 percentage point higher rate of guilt overall, but this result only exhibits very weak statistical significance at the 12 percent confidence level. It should be noted, however, that this difference represents a 7 percentage point change in the guilt frequency differences when compared to the results from panel A. For equilibrium 3, whites have a 13 percentage point lower guilty frequency, providing evidence of reverse discrimination with a high level of statistical significance. The shift from equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 3 also shifts the estimated difference by 7 percentage points, but in the opposite direction as the shift to equilibrium 2. While formal approaches do not exist to compare estimates across potential equilibria, these seven percentage point differences are quite meaningful given that KPT and this paper often find racial differences of 5 to 6 percentage points to be statistically significant. This stratification also affects the empirical implications for the male and female subsamples. For the male subsample, the differences increase to 5 percentage points and are statistically significant at the 6 percent level. Racial differences for the female subsample falls to 9 percentage points and are not statistically significant. On the other hand, for equilibrium 3a-b), whites have a lower rate of guilt overall and in both the male and female subsamples with differences ranging between 10 and 24 percentage points, and these results are statistically significant at better than the 0.1 percent level.
Clearly, the interpretation of the data depends on assumptions concerning the form of equilibrium. An assumption that equilibrium 2 holds reverses the findings of no prejudice against African-American males and eliminates the finding of prejudice against white females. On the other hand, the results for equilibrium 3 imply the exact opposite finding: reverse discrimination against white males and maintaining the finding of reverse discrimination against white females.
Admittedly, the equilibrium that provides evidence of racial prejudice identifies only small racial differences, of four percentage points, and is statistically significant only for the male subsample. One might reasonably argue that of the three potential equilibria, two are consistent with no racial prejudice and one is consistent with only a low level of racial prejudice, and therefore conclude that our empirical analysis validates the findings of KPT under a more general framework. Moreover, this paper does not undermine the key empirical fact in KPT that the overall guilt frequencies by race and many other key variables are broadly consistent with the KPT model. All of these factors tend to suggest that KPT has successfully identified a model that provides clear empirical implications and that those implications match the patterns observed in the data.
In our opinion, however, such a conclusion is not appropriate for either this particular sample or for the application of the KPT approach in future analyses. The statistically significant finding of a five percentage point racial difference in treatment for the male subsample is particularly salient, as ninety percent of the sample is male, and the policy debate concerning racial profiling has focused primarily on differential treatment of African-American males. This finding is also comparable in magnitude to findings in other markets. For example, most significant findings of adverse treatment in the recent 2000 Housing Discrimination Study fell between 4 and 6 percentage points (Ross and Turner, 2003) , and Munnell et al. (1996) found an 8 percentage point racial difference in mortgage underwriting. Of course, this paper does not directly refute KPT's conclusion that the data is consistent with no racial bias. However, the paper does raise substantial questions concerning the policy significance of such a conclusion, by showing that the data may also be consistent with a level of racial bias that is comparable in magnitude to existing estimates of discrimination in other contexts.
More generally, the central message of this study is that a note of caution may be warranted in applying the KPT approach in the future. In particular, the inferences concerning discrimination may be sensitive to the assumptions made about the type of equilibrium being played. In Table 2 , the overall difference in estimated treatment under alternative equilibria is quite large. For equilibrium 2, the guilt rate for whites exceeds that for African-Americans by 5 percentage points for the male subsample (29.6% vs. 24.6%). In contrast, for equilibrium 3, the corresponding difference is negative 10.1 percentage points (4.3% vs. 14.4%). In other words, the estimated differences in guilt rates may be up to 15 percentage points (5 vs. -10.1) apart, depending on whether equilibrium 2 or 3 is assumed to hold. In terms of the average guilt rate in the overall sample (which is approximately 30%), this represents a 50 percent difference.
4.2) Follow-up Analysis
In an attempt to shed more light on these issues, we continue our empirical analysis in order to examine whether some additional forms of equilibria can be ruled out by the data. Specifically, the supplementary analysis considers variables in the sample that might provide a proxy for the police's assessment of a potential offender's return to offending (c). Based on the theoretical model, any variable that is correlated with the return to offending will be correlated with offenders' level of guilt. Note that the level of guilt comparison must be made conditional on the guilt of individual searched in order to assure that the proxy variables are chosen based on their relationship with offense level rather than a relationship with the likelihood of guilt.
Two such variables are vehicle type, which is divided between vehicles that are owned by the motorist and those that are owned by a third-party, and time of day, which is divided between the periods of 6 AM to 4 PM (workday) and 4 PM to 6 AM (other times). The percentage of all offenses that are felonies are 35 percentage points higher for third-party than owned vehicles and almost 10 percentage points lower for the workday period than the rest of the day. Both differences exhibit a high level of statistical significance (see Table 3 ). Table 3 also shows the percentage guilty and the percentage AfricanAmerican by both vehicle type and time of day. Guilt frequencies do not vary by vehicle type. In the context of the fully randomizing equilibria, this finding supports the assumption that the police return to successful searches does not vary by the severity of offense. Otherwise, police would have an incentive to increase the rate of search for the high payoff vehicle type, which would reduce guilt rates for that type of vehicle in equilibrium. On the other hand, if one type of offender does not randomize, the equal guilt rates finding could arise with differential return across offense type since the marginal return to police search need not be equal across vehicle types.
For the time of day analysis, the frequency of guilt is more than 5 percentage points lower during the workday, and the differences are statistically significant at the 2 percent level. This finding is not consistent with either the KPT model nor with a fully randomizing equilibrium in our model (equilibrium 1). These differences can only be explained if either some types offend with certainty or the police return to search varies by type of offense, but as previously discussed the KPT model and the fully randomizing equilibrium imply equal return by offense type based on the third party vehicle guilt rates.
One objection to this variable might be that it is not an offender attribute and guilt rates might reasonably vary over time of day just as they might vary across jurisdictions. This objection, however, is based on the premise that the individual officer is performing the optimization described in the model. However, if the KPT model is to be applied to aggregate data, the model must be representative of a police department that rationally allocates resources across locations, time of day, and offender type. Otherwise, the model would only imply equal guilt rates for the searches by officers from specific shifts or by individual officers rather than for the sample as a whole.
Finally, both of these proxy variables are highly correlated with race. In the sample of searched vehicles, third party vehicles are 18 percentage points more likely to be driven by African-American motorists as compared to vehicles that are owned by the motorists. Similarly, searches that are conducted during the workday period are 9 percentage points less likely to involve African-American motorists. In both cases, African-American motorists are more highly represented for the attribute that exhibits higher rates of felony offense. Table 4 presents additional tests stratified by the two variables that predict felony offenses. Even if police do not receive differential payoffs by offense type, they clearly could use these variables in conjunction with race to better target searches. Accordingly, equilibrium 1 (fully randomizing) implies equal guilt rates by race for each outcome of the proxy variable. On the other hand, under the assumption that either equilibrium 2 or 3 holds, stratification by the proxy variable should shift the proportion of the sample either away from or towards types who offend with certainty and as a result either reduce or increase the bias in the traditional KPT test for prejudice. For vehicle type, the own vehicle sample should have lower bias under equilibrium 2 than the unconditional guilt frequency test of KPT because individuals who offend with certainty have been disproportionately eliminated from the sample, and similarly the third-party sample should have lower bias under equilibrium 3. In Table 4 , black guilt rates are higher in all cases (except for "other times," but this is not statistically significant). This appears to be consistent with the general thrust of the KPT results. However, both the type of vehicle and time of day results reject other implications of the KPT model. The low guilt rate for whites in third-party vehicles and during the workday suggest that individual officers should search vehicles stopped under those circumstances less frequently. Naturally, these findings can be viewed as consistent with reverse discrimination against white drivers of third-party vehicles and white workday drivers for the fully randomizing equilibrium. Without any apparent reason why white workday and third party vehicle drivers are discriminated against relative to white evening and own vehicle drivers, however, it seems reasonable to view these results as evidence against the fully randomizing equilibrium.
The results from the type of vehicle variable provide a partial confirmation of the findings in Table 2 . The own-vehicle sample does not provide any evidence of prejudice against African-Americans as was found in Table 2 for equilibrium 2. The third-party sample, however, identifies a 13 percentage point higher rate of guilt for African-Americans, which is consistent with the Table 2 results for equilibrium 3 and implies reverse discrimination against whites. Of course, the test for equilibrium 2 may have weak power because the own vehicle subsample contains most of the overall sample and the fraction of felony offenses only fell by about 6 percentage points from 28 in the full sample to 22 in the own vehicle subsample, while the fraction of felony offenses is almost 30 percentage points higher in the third-party vehicle than in the overall sample. In fact, the difference between African-American and white guilt rates for the own vehicle sample fell by one percentage point, which if equilibrium 2 holds is consistent with a small decrease in the bias.
The results for the time of day variable, however, are quite at odds with the previous findings. The use of the workday sample should have reduced the bias under equilibrium 2, shifting the results towards finding prejudice against African-Americans as was found in panel B of Table 2 . Instead, AfricanAmericans are 7 percentage points more likely to be guilty in workday sample, which is consistent with reverse discrimination. Similarly, the use of the "other times" sample should have reduced bias under equilibrium 3 that in Table 2 supported a conclusion of reverse discrimination, and yet African-Americans are 5 percentage points less likely to be guilty in the other time sample, which represents a shift in guilt frequencies towards a finding of racial prejudice. Conditional on the earlier assumptions in the model, this contradiction suggests that the data is not consistent with either equilibrium 2 or 3.
In summary, the results for the type of vehicle analysis are at least weakly consistent with the two equilibria where one type of offender offends with certainty, but lead to a rejection of the fully randomizing equilibrium. In the context of the KPT model, it is difficult to explain the low rate of guilt for whites when driving third party vehicles. Moreover, given the maintained assumptions in the model, the results for time of day are inconsistent with all of the equilibria considered. Equilibrium 1 is rejected because guilt rates are not equal across the time of day variable, as well as due to low guilt rates for white drivers during the workday. Equilibria 2 and 3 are rejected because the analyses in Tables 2 and 4 are contradictory. If the behavior of agents is described by either equilibrium 2 or 3, Table 2 provides unbiased tests for prejudice, and the stratification by time of day in Table 4 should reduce the magnitude of the bias in the test relative to the KPT test based on unconditional guilt frequencies. This stratification produces racial differences in guilt that are further away from the Table 2 Panel B and C estimates as compared to the KPT estimates in Panel A. These findings suggest that one or more of the maintained assumptions in the theoretical model are incorrect.
Two assumptions imposed in both our model and that of KPT are that the return to police is the same across offense types and that the cost of search is not the same between workday and other times. In the context of the fully randomizing equilibrium, the equal guilt rates over vehicle type suggest equal return to police for felony and misdemeanor drug amounts, and accordingly the 5 percentage point lower rate of guilt during the workday when compared to evening would need to be explained by higher cost of search at night. On the other hand, identifying appropriate interpretations of these findings is dramatically more problematic under the possibility that some groups offend with certainty, which is the outcome supported by the data. In that case, the guilt frequency is affected by unobserved attributes of drivers in different situations and little can be directly inferred from guilt rates across driver attributes.
Finally, the dramatic differences between the findings in table 2 and the time of day analysis suggest that the workday and night periods might represent separate equilibria. The average guilt rates in these equilibria might differ, for example, because police departments are not capable of precisely allocating resources across times in order to set the marginal return to search equal across periods. As discussed earlier, however, if police departments cannot allocate resources effectively across time, they should not be expected to allocate resources effectively over space or even across the search activities of different officers. Alternatively, there may be differences in the cost of search or the benefits of finding contraband across the time periods. The nature of police incentives and behavior is an important issue for future research. In any event, the possibility that police may not be optimizing suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting equal guilt rates as evidence of the absence of racial bias.
5) Conclusion
This paper reexamines the theoretical and empirical framework developed by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) to analyze racial bias in motor vehicle searches. We have generalized the KPT model to account for the possibility that potential offenders are not always observed by the police, and by including two different levels of offense severity. While these extensions are quite straightforward, they lead to the existence of multiple types of equilibria, including some in which potential offenders do not randomize, but rather offend with certainty. The validity of KPT's simple empirical test for prejudice depends crucially on which of these types of equilibria prevail, as well as on a number of other maintained assumptions. Our empirical analysis shows that the data used by KPT is consistent with policing that is biased either against or in favor of AfricanAmerican males, or is unbiased, depending on which equilibrium is being played. Additional analyses based on stratification by type of vehicle and time of day were conducted. The results from the type of vehicle analysis rejects the fully randomizing equilibrium, and the findings from the time of day analysis are not consistent with any of the three equilibria considered.
Thus, while the theoretical model in KPT is elegant and appears to offer a simple solution to the very difficult problem of omitted variables bias in analyses of discrimination in policing, the results above suggest that theory is unlikely to solve the omitted variables problem often associated with tests for racial prejudice and discrimination in law enforcement and in other contexts. An alternative solution to these problems in the racial profiling context is to determine the factors considered by police during their patrols and undertake efforts to generate information on the distribution of these attributes in the relevant population of motorists. Potential strategies for gathering such information might include the use of traditional trip diaries (Scott and Kanaroglou, 2002) or random monitoring of roadways to record the incidence of factors that might lead to police stops.
